The appointment of a new Prosecutor General has once again drawn public attention to this institution. But what matters more is this: what should the Prosecutor’s Office look like during wartime and after? Can it become the center that unites the efforts of the entire law enforcement and justice system?

In the first months of the full-scale war, Ukrainians impressed the world with their cohesion, self-organization, and swift decision-making free from excessive bureaucracy. People acted instantly, challenging fear and inertia. The emergency united society: volunteers and police operated as a single mechanism, the military and medics as a coordinated organism. It seemed we had all tapped into an inner resource to overcome chaos.

However, just a few months later, in the rear, the old problems began to resurface. War destroys not only buildings – it undermines the legal system, weakens coordination between state institutions, and creates fertile ground for impunity. Fragmentation, institutional competition, and delays in decision-making returned. New, larger-scale challenges also emerged. Society demands justice – not only for the war crimes of which hundreds of thousands have been committed – but also for human rights violations, corruption, abuse of power, crimes against property, life, and safety. Yet this demand cannot be met without a clear coordination mechanism. The Prosecutor’s Office should be the center of this process, setting criminal prosecution policy and establishing national coordination priorities.

Following the 2014–2016 prosecutorial reform, the function of so-called "general oversight" was abolished – an element that had survived for decades in Ukraine’s legal tradition as a Soviet-era legacy. In 2016, amendments to the Constitution defined the prosecution’s functions as: representing public prosecution in court; organizing and overseeing pretrial investigations; addressing other legal matters during criminal proceedings; supervising covert and investigative actions by law enforcement agencies; and representing the state in court in exceptional cases defined by law. The reform aimed to reduce power concentration within the prosecution and bring it closer to European standards. The Venice Commission supported this in its conclusions, noting that the Soviet-style "general supervision" was incompatible with the principles of the rule of law. In Opinion No. 735/2013 on the draft law "On the Prosecution," the Commission emphasized the need for the prosecution to focus on criminal prosecution, representation of the state, and protection of citizens’ rights. This wasn’t about removing the prosecution from the justice system, but about reforming it – with clear division of powers, depoliticization, and adherence to the rule of law. Still, the Constitution does not mention the coordination function, which would help define the prosecution’s role within the criminal justice system, investigative bodies, and agencies responsible for punishment enforcement. Currently, under martial law, constitutional amendments are currently impossible, but such a step would be vital in the future. Proper implementation of the coordination function would also help eliminate the current substitution of law enforcement agencies.

The current law partially addresses this issue. Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Prosecutor’s Office" defines coordination as one of its key functions. However, this provision remains isolated – lacking supporting mechanisms, integration into related legal acts, and enforcement measures. As a result: duplicated investigations of the same offenses; criminal cases being bounced between agencies with notes like "not under our jurisdiction"; lost proceedings; prosecutors inspecting crime scenes themselves; departments duplicating the functions of law enforcement bodies – leading to fragmented resources, delays, suspects fleeing abroad, and more. The Prosecutor’s Office is the only institution capable of ensuring real cooperation among law enforcement and supervisory bodies in criminal justice to prevent and combat crime and corruption. Yet it fails to do so, mainly due to systemic limitations rather than internal unwillingness.

In a country simultaneously fighting a war and attempting reforms, this is a direct waste of potential. To grasp the scale of the issue, consider just a few high-profile cases – from defense sector abuses to investigations into stolen humanitarian aid. In each case: institutional misalignment, unclear jurisdiction, lack of a common investigative strategy. Meanwhile, the number of crimes grows.

History shows that after major wars, societies face not just economic devastation, but also crime surges. After WWI, many European countries experienced hyperinflation, unemployment, and legal instability, which fostered organized crime – especially amid the demobilization of millions. In postwar Germany of the 1920s, the crime rate rose so sharply that police in many regions lost control of the streets. After WWII, countries like France, Italy, Ukraine, and others saw spikes in armed assaults, murders, robberies, black-market trade, smuggling, and crimes involving leftover weapons in hands of civilians.

Ukraine must learn from these lessons. We cannot afford delay – let alone imitation. Crime does not disappear during war – it changes form. Already, in the rear, we’re seeing a rise in the shadow economy, economic crimes, corruption, illegal arms trafficking. There’s been a surge in raider attacks masked by martial law, fraud, and domestic violence. Arson, sabotage, and provocations are being recorded. After the fighting ends, we may face crimes involving new types of weapons (e.g., FPV drones), as well as violence linked to PTSD, and clashes between civilians and demobilized soldiers. This could result in the emergence of a new type of criminal environment and fragmentation of the rule of law. To avoid repeating past tragedies, we must act preventively now.

In these conditions, the classical model of fighting crime is ineffective. Each agency operates independently, with its own plan and media policy. Joint meetings exist, but often serve a purely formal role – something is signed, photos are taken. Resolutions carry no obligation, no sanctions, no legal binding. Institutions function – but not effectively together. A vacuum forms, ripe for criminality. Despite its status, the Prosecutor General currently lacks the authority to enforce joint strategy implementation. In 2021, the Prosecutor General issued a declarative order on coordination (No. 28, amended by Order No. 3 of 02.01.2023), but in practice, it amounted to mere imitation.

The Prosecutor’s Office, as an institution of balance, could become the unifying body. Not as a superstructure with unlimited powers, but as an organizational center, with access to operational information for coordination and the ability to engage in preventative activity (i.e., crime prevention). Not a punitive agency, not a political tool – but a framework that brings together fragments of justice scattered across dozens of bodies. This model already exists in some European countries, though with different approaches. In France, prosecutors hold broad administrative powers to coordinate law enforcement, serving as a central hub. In Italy, the prosecution service is granted procedural and administrative coordination powers over all law enforcement activities. Even in Poland, whose structure resembles ours, the Prosecutor General (also the Minister of Justice) is vested with extended coordination and supervisory powers and can initiate the creation of interagency investigative groups with participation from the Anti-Corruption Bureau, police, and other law enforcement bodies.

So why haven’t we moved in this direction? Partly due to inertia. Partly due to fear of reverting to the Soviet-style prosecution system. But legislative gaps have created the illusion of neutrality – behind which lie chaos and impunity. Without real coordination, the criminal justice system will fail to meet societal demands.

What should be done? First and foremost, expand the coordination function in law. It must be clearly defined in the Constitution of Ukraine, the core law, and outlined in departmental legal acts. The grounds, procedures, timelines, monitoring, accountability, and implementation mechanisms must be specified. The Prosecutor’s Office should be obligated to convene and organize joint meetings, form interagency investigative teams, and align investigative approaches. Regular, public reporting with real data – not vague generalities – must be ensured. Accountability should be both parliamentary and public. And above all, there must be political will to build a new kind of Prosecutor’s Office – not one that punishes indiscriminately, nor one that observes powerlessly, but one that is institutionally responsible and capable of effective coordination.