ContentsThe essence of the Ottawa Convention and the process of its denunciationThe U.S. position: what might changeThe Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea as a deterrent: where and how its analogue can be recreatedKorea’s example for Ukraine: diplomacy, challenges, and technical detailsAnti-personnel mine coalition: June withdrawalAccording to Article 20 of the Ottawa Convention, any state party may terminate its participation by submitting written notification to the UN Secretary-General, the depositary of the Convention. The withdrawal takes effect six months after such notification is received. Until then, all obligations remain fully in force.In June 2025, the Baltic States completed all internal procedures for denunciation and submitted the relevant notifications. Finland also completed its internal procedure in June, but as of early July, notification to the depositary had not yet been confirmed. In June, Poland approved the denunciation of the Convention in the Sejm; the document must now pass the Senate, after which notification to the UN will be possible. In Ukraine, the president enacted the National Security and Defense Council’s decision to withdraw from the Convention by decree in June. Politically and militarily, this already expands Ukraine’s options both on the battlefield and in cooperation with partners. At the same time, according to the Law of Ukraine "On International Treaties of Ukraine," the termination of an international treaty that entered into force as a law (in the case of the Ottawa Convention – Law No. 2566-IV of 18.05.2005) requires the adoption of a separate law on denunciation. Only after this can Ukraine send an official notification to the depositary – the UN Secretary-General.Thus, at the beginning of 2026, the Baltic States, Finland, Poland, and Ukraine may find themselves united in a kind of "anti-personnel mine coalition" to deter Russian territorial ambitions. Such a coalition will likely exist for a long time, against the backdrop of the continued pan-European course toward banning anti-personnel mines.States parties to the Ottawa Convention, which (as of the withdrawal of the Baltic States, Finland, and Poland) include all EU countries and almost all NATO countries (except the U.S.), are obliged to refrain from any form of participation in the production of anti-personnel mines by other states. This follows from Article 1(1)(c) of the Convention, which prohibits assisting, encouraging, or inducing any activity prohibited by this treaty. Accordingly, even indirect financing, technological support, participation in production chains, or tolerating the activities of companies involved in the production of anti-personnel mines constitutes a violation of the parties’ obligations under the Convention. Thus, EU and NATO countries that remain parties to the Ottawa Convention will be legally restricted from assisting, supplying components, or financing any activity related to anti-personnel mines for the benefit of states that withdraw from the Convention – even if such cooperation takes place within the framework of general defense partnerships.The resumption of anti-personnel mine production will likely take place locally, at the expense of the states themselves – both nationally and in cooperation between Ukraine, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States.Anti-personnel mines and the U.S.Among the parties to the Ottawa Convention, neither the U.S. nor the Republic of Korea is included. Both countries have always maintained an exceptional position, justified by national security considerations, despite the general international stigmatization of anti-personnel mines.U.S. policy on such mines has existed for a long time, but its content has changed depending on the political administration. In 2014, the Obama administration announced a refusal to use anti-personnel mines outside the Korean Peninsula, leaving in place the so-called "Korean exception." In 2020, the Trump administration lifted this restriction, allowing the use of non-persistent anti-personnel mines worldwide, depending on military necessity. In June 2022, the Biden administration reinstated Obama’s policy – again limiting the use of anti-personnel mines to the Korean Peninsula and declaring an intention to comply with the Convention’s provisions, though without formal accession.As of 2025, the second Trump administration has not announced an updated policy on anti-personnel mines. At the same time, it can be assumed that the provisions established in 2020, which are less restrictive than Biden’s policy, remain in force.In 2022–2023, the U.S. supplied Ukraine with about 10,200 RAAMS (Remote Anti-Armor Mine System) artillery shells. Each 155mm shell disperses nine anti-tank mines, which self-destruct after a set period – usually from 4 to 48 hours. These munitions are permitted by the Ottawa Convention, as its ban applies only to anti-personnel mines. As a state party, Ukraine did not violate its obligations, and the use of RAAMS was seen as a legitimate tool to deter Russian armored units without violating international humanitarian law.In November 2024, the U.S. for the first time supplied Ukraine with anti-personnel mines in the form of ADAM (Area Denial Artillery Munition) artillery shells, specifically the M692 and M731 modifications. Each such shell contains 36 mines with tripwires that are activated by a load of 405 grams. Although these mines are classified as "non-persistent" because their activity is limited by a battery charge (about 48 hours for the M67 and 4 hours for the M72), the explosive charge itself remains dangerous until physically neutralized. The Biden administration justified this supply by the limited duration, high accuracy, and Ukraine’s responsible policy regarding the use of such weapons. However, from a legal point of view, this already went beyond the restrictions of the Ottawa Convention, of which Ukraine was still a party at the time.The Republic of Korea, like the U.S., is not a party to the Ottawa Convention. Its government consistently emphasizes that a complete ban on anti-personnel mines is unacceptable under the constant threat from North Korea. Minefields along the demilitarized zone remain a key element in deterring a potential northern offensive. Seoul has repeatedly stated that the possibility of joining the Ottawa Convention will be considered only after the establishment of stable and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.Security belt: mines in Korea’s Demilitarized Zone and on NATO’s eastern flankThe Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea stretches for 250 km along the 38th parallel and is nominally 4 km wide. However, not all of this territory is densely mined. The main mining zone is concentrated in strips about 1.5–2 km deep, fortified with fences, firing positions, and surveillance systems.According to the South Korean government and international sources, about 1.27 million mines, mostly anti-personnel types such as the M14 and M16A1, are located on the southern side of the DMZ and in the adjacent Civilian Control Zone (CCZ). They are laid in more than 500 confirmed minefields, with densities exceeding 12,000 mines per square kilometer in the most fortified areas. In addition, there are unconfirmed or unmapped minefields left from the Korean War and early U.S. deployments, increasing the total mined area to over 114 km².The logic behind the construction of Korean minefields is to restrict enemy maneuver by creating forbidden zones, save personnel by reducing the need for constant patrolling, slow down an offensive to prepare for fire strikes, and create a psychological effect due to the presence of "dead zones" even in peacetime.Extrapolating the logic of the DMZ and CCZ to NATO’s eastern flank and Ukraine – given the similarity of North Korean and Russian offensive tactics – allows for an estimate of the number of anti-personnel mines that Ukraine, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States may need if they launch their own production.If Ukraine aims to create a mine-engineering deterrence system similar to Korea’s along its most vulnerable eastern and northern borders (with a total length of about 1,000 km), this will require a significant number of mines. A belt 2 km deep along a 500 km priority front would cover 1,000 km² and require about 12 million mines. Full coverage of the entire 1,000-kilometer line would double this figure to 24 million. Even limited mining of key invasion routes would likely require 6 to 12 million mines.In Poland, the strategic focus is on the 400-kilometer border with Belarus. Applying the Korean mining model with a depth of 2 km would require covering 800 km², which corresponds to about 9.6 million mines. If mining is focused on the 200–300 km most vulnerable sections, the need drops to 4–5 million.Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania together have about 900 km of land border with Russia and Belarus. Much of this territory includes swamps, forests, and narrow transport corridors. Priority mining of 600 km of this front with a depth of 2 km would cover 1,200 km² and require about 14.4 million mines. A more selective approach to 400 km would still require about 10 million.Finland has the longest land border with Russia among EU and NATO countries – about 1,300 km. However, not all of this territory is equally vulnerable. If priority is given to 600 km, a belt 2 km deep would cover 1,200 km² and require about 14.4 million mines. Limiting this zone to 400 km would reduce the area to 800 km² and the need to 9.6 million mines. In total, full replication of the Korean model for Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland would require over 55 million mines.This creates significant challenges in production, logistics, and political feasibility. Instead, a lower-density model may be more realistic. If density is reduced to 6,000 mines per square kilometer, the length of mine lines is shortened, and the system is supplemented with modern remote surveillance, fire control, and rapid mining systems, countries can create an effective deterrent barrier at acceptable costs.With this model, Ukraine would need about 6 million mines for a 1,000 km² belt. Poland – about 3.6 million for 600 km². The Baltic States – 4.8 million for 800 km². Finland – another 4.8 million for 800 km² of priority areas. These volumes remain significant but are achievable within a few years with stable national production or international cooperation. Assessment of mine needs to deter Russia on NATO’s eastern flankLessons from Korea for Ukraine and key challengesStationary mine-engineering defense can be an effective deterrent if integrated into a multi-layered system that includes surveillance, rapid response forces, and clearly defined rules of engagement. South Korea has placed its minefields within a broader network of fences, sensor systems, and engineering barriers. Such synergy of passive and active defense allows the line to be held with fewer forces, saving resources without losing control over the line of demarcation or border.At the same time, a densely mined and fortified demilitarized zone carries risks associated with long-term mining. The first challenge is the need for careful mapping and maintaining awareness of minefield locations over decades. Today, the Republic of Korea is forced to spend significant resources on demining and monitoring outdated, unmapped areas.The second challenge is the diplomatic cost. European countries now withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention may not receive the same level of international understanding as the Republic of Korea. The policy of mining an active or potential front with Russia will require additional explanations – regarding urgency, linkage to a specific threat, and the implementation of clear control mechanisms.The third challenge concerns the limitations of mines as a self-sufficient means of defense. The Korean DMZ shows that static minefields cannot replace the need for mobility, flexibility, and technological adaptation. Today, South Korea is gradually reducing its reliance on mines, introducing automated sensor networks, unmanned platforms, and high-precision long-range weapons. For Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic States, where the front line is dynamic and threats are constantly changing, excessive reliance on stationary mine barriers may create vulnerabilities if not balanced by maneuver capabilities and systems for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target designation.The fourth challenge relates to the political and identity significance of mines. The DMZ demonstrates that mine barriers shape not only the security environment but also the political imagination of borders. The fortified demilitarized zone, which does not have the status of an internationally recognized border, has become for Korea a symbol of a long – and possibly irreversible – division. In the Ukrainian context, defensive mining should avoid turning into a de facto border with temporarily occupied territories.If such minefields are deployed, they should be accompanied by a policy of gradual demining after reintegration of territories, transparent procedures, and commitments to minimize risks to the civilian population.