Slogans such as “Death to Hungarians” and “Hungarians out” were painted on the church walls. Both Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán expressed strong outrage over the incident. However, it might be more appropriate for them to direct their complaints to their partners in Lubyanka, as this provocation bears clear hallmarks of the Russian FSB. The attack also mirrors a similar incident with proven Moscow links.In 2018, two individuals set fire to the Hungarian Cultural Center in Ukraine’s Uzhhorod by throwing a Molotov cocktail. The Security Service of Ukraine quickly identified the perpetrators as Polish citizens affiliated with the far-right extremist group Falanga. In 2020, a court in Krakow ruled that the attackers acted on behalf of Manuel Ochsenreiter, an assistant to German Bundestag member Markus Frohnmaier from the neo-Nazi AfD party.Polish prosecutors classified this crime as a terrorist act aimed at “disrupting the Ukrainian state and deepening national divisions between Ukrainians and Hungarians.” The investigation also revealed a Russian connection: Manuel Oksenreiter met several times with Alexander Dugin, a prominent Russian ideologue. They collaborated at the Katehon Center, where Russian billionaire Konstantin Malofeev — who financed the initial escalation of the conflict in Donbas in 2014 — is chairman of the supervisory board.This shows that Russian provocateurs’ methods have remained consistent over the years. Although, while Moscow previously sought agents within Europe’s political underworld, today Hungary’s Prime Minister has personally become both a mouthpiece and a key element of Russian psychological operations.Read also: Russian propaganda exploits Zakarpattia church arson to fuel 'Hungarian oppression' claims in UkraineWhile I do not suggest Viktor Orbán personally takes orders “from the major,” he consistently operates within the framework of Russian disinformation strategies aimed at discrediting Ukraine, leveraging these narratives for his own political gain.In addition to the attack on the Hungarian church, a scandal has erupted over the alleged death of Yosyp Shebeshten, a Ukrainian citizen of Hungarian origin, at a recruitment center. It is clear that a thorough investigation must establish the facts in this case.However, it is very telling that Viktor Orbán personally intervened, stating he would demand EU sanctions against Ukraine and banning three Ukrainian officers responsible for mobilization from entering Hungary.Notably, Orbán’s campaign coincided with Russian targeted bombings of recruitment centers across Ukraine, aimed at disrupting the mobilization process.Viktor Orbán is losing support within Hungary and is attempting to rally conservative voters by stirring up anti-Ukrainian sentiment. However, these efforts are increasingly ineffective. The banned LGBT march in Budapest at the end of June instead became a large anti-Orbán demonstration.Opposition leader Péter Magyar wisely chose not to participate, preserving his political flexibility on the right wing. This strategy appears to be working: according to the latest poll from June 19, Orbán’s Fidesz party holds 36% support, while Magyar’s Tisza party leads with 51%.While much can change before the 2026 parliamentary elections, it is already evident that Orbán’s anti-Ukrainian tactics are failing to produce the desired results. We can cautiously hope that, following a change of government in Budapest, Hungary will finally break free from Kremlin influence, leading to warmer relations between the neighboring countries.SourceAbout the author. Mykola Knyazhytskyi, journalist, Member of Ukrainian ParliamentThe editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by the authors of blogs or columns.