New potential details of the conversations between the leaders of the United States and Russia emerge daily. These details are based, in part, on communications that the U.S. president had with European leaders and the president of Ukraine shortly after the Anchorage summit.There are no Russian confirmations of the information from Western media or Trump himself. Therefore, some key points may be the imagination of the U.S. president, not based on his dialogue with his Russian counterpart. Still, these are important points worth discussing.The first condition of the Russian leader is that there will be no ceasefire until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached. This is a fundamental condition of the Kremlin chief and differs from the proposal Donald Trump made immediately after he was elected U.S. president. At that time, he tried to draw Putin into a negotiation process after a ceasefire on the Russian-Ukrainian front.Trump has been promoting this idea since his first telephone conversation with the Russian leader. In May, he abandoned the idea that the ceasefire should be unconditional. This paved the way for the resumption of simulated negotiations in Istanbul, the purpose of which was precisely to work out the terms of a possible ceasefire on the Russian-Ukrainian front.But now, as we can see, Trump may completely switch to Putin's position, at least his own words publicly confirm this when we hear statements that comprehensive peace is better than a ceasefire, which can be broken at any moment. It is interesting whether Trump was aware of this when he began calling Putin with such a proposal and why he changed his position.Putin's second condition concerns the so-called territorial swap.Although this is not really a swap, since it concerns how Russia would like to exchange some parts of Ukrainian territory for other parts. The problem is that Russia does not recognize most of Ukraine’s territory as Ukrainian.Thus, Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces leave all territory in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In return, Moscow promises to freeze the front lines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions and return the territory it currently occupies in Sumy and Kharkiv regions of Ukraine.Even if we look at these demands formally, we understand that the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the vast territory of Donetsk region cannot even be compared to the territory currently occupied in Sumy and Kharkiv regions of Ukraine.All this seems, to put it mildly, very strange. Why? Because we understand perfectly well that, firstly, Ukraine itself has no reason to withdraw its troops from the territories controlled by the legitimate Ukrainian government, where Ukrainian citizens live who have nothing to do with the Russian occupation and Russian fantasies about the subjects of the Federation in Donetsk region.Secondly, from the point of view of the Russian Federation itself, the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions are subjects of Russia. Why then is Russia ready to agree that Ukraine will continue to control part of the territory that Russia considers its own, while withdrawing from the other part? This is completely illogical, even from the point of view of Russian political thinking, not even considering the Ukrainian one.And so it seems to me that Putin proposed this idea, if he proposed it at all, for the sake of political destabilization in Ukraine. Putin's third condition is recognition of the Russian Federation's sovereignty over Crimea. It is not clear from whom Russia is demanding such recognition: from Ukraine or from other states, such as the United States.I would like to remind you that Donald Trump once proposed that the United States recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea in exchange for a ceasefire on the Russian-Ukrainian front. This, in turn, would make it possible to begin lifting sanctions against the Russian Federation. And perhaps Putin has decided to return to this very idea.The idea is that if the Russian Federation’s sovereignty over Crimea is recognized, it would open the way to fulfilling another condition — the lifting of Western sanctions, or at least part of them, against Russia.But it is obvious that it would be ideal for Russia if Ukraine itself recognized Russia's sovereignty over Crimea, taking advantage of all these Russian fabrications about the illegal transfer of the Crimean region from Russia to the Ukrainian SSR. In this way, at least the Crimean issue would be settled as a result of this war, with the country that had its territory taken acknowledging the legitimacy of the separation.And then, of course, the next steps will be demands to recognize Russia's sovereignty over the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. And if that happens, Russia will have opportunities to occupy other Ukrainian regions. This is a typical salami tactic. Another condition set by Russia is that Ukraine must be officially prohibited from joining the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO countries cannot be forced to guarantee that a country will not join the North Atlantic Alliance, as this would violate their sovereignty and the NATO charter. From the point of view of this organization, the country that wants to join NATO must decide for itself whether it wants to do so. And NATO must decide on its accession after receiving a proposal for membership.So when we talk about prohibiting NATO membership, it is impossible to make such a decision at the NATO level, although Russia, as we know, has been demanding since 2022 that the North Atlantic Alliance officially promise that the Russian Federation will receive clear guarantees from NATO regarding non-proliferation in the territories of the former Soviet republics.Well, one solution here could be for Ukraine to amend its Constitution, declare itself a neutral state, and prohibit itself from joining NATO. But these are also very conditional guarantees, because the Constitution can be amended to reject Euro-Atlantic integration, and then, when the political opportunity arises, an article can be reintroduced into it about Ukraine's desire to join NATO.After all, when the Russian Federation annexed Crimea, Ukraine was a non-aligned state. So changes to the Constitution are, as we understand it, a fairly simple matter. And I find it very difficult to understand why Russia is confident that some changes to the Ukrainian Constitution can guarantee that in the event of a political crisis in Russia, when Moscow is preoccupied with its own affairs, Ukraine will not seize the opportunity and join NATO. A striking example is Finland, which for decades did not join NATO precisely because it had special relations with the Soviet Union, but against the backdrop of the crisis surrounding the Russian-Ukrainian war, it seized the opportunity and joined the North Atlantic Alliance. This completely changed the entire logistics of military relations in northern Europe.The next issue is also quite important — the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine. There is currently a lot of discussion about this. According to diplomats, Putin agreed to discuss these guarantees at his meeting with Trump, but the vision of these guarantees may differ.The United States proposes, for example, that Ukraine receive guarantees comparable to NATO's Article 5, but that would not lead to Ukraine's accession to NATO. This is also completely illogical, because Russia, as you understand, is not afraid that NATO will appear near its borders. It is already there. Rather, it is afraid that Ukraine's accession to NATO will prevent the Russian Federation from occupying the entire territory of Ukraine in the future, which is considered by the Russian state to be a temporary entity.And if Ukraine receives guarantees that the United States and other Western countries will be ready to fight alongside Ukrainians in the event of another Russian attack, to fight Russian occupiers alongside Ukrainians, and to destroy Russia's strategic assets. And perhaps bring the situation to the brink of nuclear war, then how is this different from Ukraine joining NATO, if Russia plans to continue the war with Ukraine in the future? It is completely unclear. That is why Putin proposes that China act as Ukraine’s security guarantor. In other words, these guarantees would resemble a new Budapest Memorandum, which Russia could use as a pretext if it decided to attack Ukraine again to occupy more territory.Finally, there is one last issue, which is completely, I would say, classic: Putin has been raising it since 2004, when the Kremlin supported its puppet, the detested agent Viktor Yanukovych, in Ukraine’s presidential elections.This concerns the state status of the Russian language, at least in parts of Ukraine that Putin considers a Bolshevik “gift” to Kyiv — the east and south. And, of course, the continued presence of the Russian Orthodox Church as a civilizational center of Moscow on Ukrainian soil. Putin understands that if the Russian language and church remain in Ukraine, sooner or later, by military or political means, Ukraine could become part of Russia.He wants to lay the groundwork for his allies so that, if he fails to destroy our state now, these possibilities could ultimately lead to the disappearance of the Ukrainian state under the civilizational influence of Russian culture, language, and church — components of Russia’s civilizational expansion into neighboring territory. Because missiles, bombs, and deaths, sooner or later, as with any war, are forgotten — but the Russian language and church remain and will accomplish their purpose, believe me.In this regard, it is also an absolute classic of the genre.Russia has not abandoned any, I would say, paradigms for eliminating Ukrainian statehood — whether by force, if possible now; politically, if it can sway the U.S. president; or civilizationally, if the destruction of the Ukrainian state must be postponed.And this is the essence of what happened in Anchorage during the meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian leader Putin. Russia is still planning, not so much the end of the war, nor even its continuation, but rather a plan to destroy Ukraine — quickly or slowly, depending on how things unfold.SourceAbout the author. Vitaly Portnikov, journalist, laureate of the Shevchenko National Prize of Ukraine.The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog or column authors.