Contents'Cold summer' of 2025: Ukraine's milestone special operationsLong-range strikes to tactical depth: what reduced the potential of special operationsWhy missiles are critically important for special operations — and why Ukraine doesn't have themStarred task for the Defense Ministry: provide missile capability'Cold summer' of 2025: Ukraine's milestone special operationsFrom the very first day of June, when the Ukrainian Security Service carried out the unique Spider's Web operation deep inside Russian-held territory, the tally can be taken. Ukrainian drones attacked four Russian military airfields at once — Belaya, Dyagilevo, Olenya, and Ivanovo — and the estimated cost of destroyed or damaged Russian aircraft was put at several billion dollars. Recall that by some estimates over 30% of cruise-missile carriers were hit, while U.S. calculations counted roughly 20 aircraft damaged in total, up to ten of which were destroyed. Among the neutralized airframes were the strategic Tu-95MS and Tu-160.That operation clearly demonstrated that asymmetric strikes can achieve disproportionate results and equate to the doctrine of modern warfare. At the same time, innovative solutions could be used, such as concentrating strike drones in a “sleeping” state on enemy territory.At the end of June, the Defense Forces struck the Russian military airfield Marinovka in the Volgograd region — more than 400 km from territories controlled by Ukraine — damaging four enemy Su-34 aircraft.Also in June, an unusually organized attack was carried out on a drone production facility in Tatarstan — not only using A-22s but also a glider-kamikaze with a 100-kg warhead. The shift toward systematic strikes on defense-industrial enterprises, energy infrastructure, and airfields itself became important.Sometimes the Defense Forces achieved truly spectacular feats, such as the June 2025 destruction of an Iskander OTRK launcher and damage to two more launchers — the first known and visually confirmed case of enemy OTRKs being hit directly on their launching positions.Also in June, a drone attack struck a chemical plant in Stavropol Krai — at least ten explosions were recorded in the industrial zone.In August, the Defense Forces intensified attacks on Russian oil refining and even twice halted operations of the Druzhba main oil pipeline. In early August, Ukrainian strike drones flew over 2,000 km from the border to strike a refinery in the Komi Republic.Indeed, oil refineries were more accessible targets, and perhaps for that reason they received primary attention. As a result, in August it became known that Ukrainian drones had taken out 13% of Russia’s oil refining capacity.Finally, on Independence Day, 24 August 2025, strike drones attacked one of the largest gas-processing plants in Europe — Russia’s Gazprom Ust-Luga.Thus, in the summer of 2025 the Defense Forces effectively tested a new concept of “deep strikes” against Russia.Long-range strikes to tactical depth: what reduced the potential of special operationsAt the same time, despite all the evident positives for Ukraine, analysis of Ukrainian special operations and strikes into Russian depth in summer 2025 reveals an obvious weakness in strike means. The Defense Forces managed to bypass (or penetrate) Russia's air defenses and achieve decisive accuracy (the enemy often reported up to a dozen drones whose explosions caused fires at facilities), but the power of these strikes was clearly insufficient.It is telling, for example, that when striking the command post of the 132nd Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the 51st Russian Army in occupied Yenakiieve in Donetsk at tactical depth, the Defense Forces had to use the long-range loitering munition FP-1 with a range up to 1,600 km — precisely because of its powerful 120 kg warhead. Likewise, in June during the attack on a production facility for Shahed/Geran‑type drones, the use of an explosive‑laden A-22 and a 100‑kg kamikaze drone was, to some degree, an “art of the possible” under the extreme shortage of high‑power strike means.In other words, successful drone attacks by the Defense Forces took place against the backdrop of their own “missile powerlessness” and the U.S. ban on using Western missiles against Russian targets.Why missiles are critically important for special operations — and why Ukraine doesn't have themOnly at the end of August did the United States approve the sale to Ukraine of more than 3,000 air-to-surface ERAM missiles with a range of up to 450 km. But these missiles, unfortunately, will not provide deep-strike capability, because for powerful saturation attacks Ukraine needs several thousand missiles, of which at least 10% should be ballistic, and the overall length of the missile arm should be at least 700 km.So, despite the real successes of special operations, their potential so far remains far from realized. Practically throughout the summer of 2025 there was no news of special operations carried out using long-range missiles. And this noticeably limited Ukraine’s options.If Western-manufactured missiles are a partner-provided solution, the story of missiles not produced by the domestic defense industry requires separate investigation. Since summer 2023, leaders at various levels — primarily the Ministry of Defense and Minstrategprom — assured the public that Ukraine was already producing missiles or had “worked-up experimental samples.”It also deserves separate study why Ukraine failed to purchase missiles. There are at least five to seven countries, including some with which Kyiv has a high level of military-technical cooperation, where buying missiles would be realistic. However, knowledgeable specialists say they have not heard of corresponding requests sent by the Ukrainian side.This situation deserves special attention because the industrial ministry (Minstrategprom) proved unable to supply the army with domestically produced missiles, yet its former heads remained within power structures: in the President's Office, in Ukroboronprom, and in the Defense Ministry, instead of taking responsibility.At the same time, the authorities effectively resorted to additional, so‑to‑speak, pre‑holiday missile PR — apparently to create a stronger negotiating position with the Kremlin regime. It is hard to disagree that every attempt to strengthen one’s position this way seems a strategically correct move. But, as they say, it is not enough.At first, as we recall, on the eve of Independence Day President Zelenskyy announced successful tests of a new domestic cruise missile Flamingo (FP-5) with a 1,150‑kg warhead and a range of 3,000 km, noting that mass production was to begin in January–February. Perhaps the FP-5 Flamingo will become a unique weapon if it proves capable of reaching targets and accurately hitting enemy objects. We can hope this will happen, although the context makes it clear that this pertains to 2026. For now, the missile manufacturer — Fire Point — is fulfilling a giant order for FP-1 drones, and it received a 100% advance payment. Other drone manufacturers do not enjoy such preferences.Then, on Independence Day itself, another long‑range cruise missile — the R‑360 Neptune — was officially shown for the first time, dubbed the Long Neptune. It was claimed that the missile passed tests in March 2025 and strikes targets at a range of 1,000 km. Experts noted that in the demonstration video the missile is not explicitly named, and moreover the launch footage was identified as old, filmed during coastal Neptune complex live‑fire tests in 2018–2020. No specifications of this missile have been published, although a 1,000‑km range had been mentioned earlier, as well as that the missile is intended for striking land targets. Thus, despite already having about a dozen names for Ukrainian missiles, in fact the number of “missile questions” only grows. To move forward, answers must be found to all these questions — including why in summer 2025 the Defense Forces were striking the enemy while practically lacking missiles.Top-priority task for the Defense Ministry: provide missile capabilitySpecial operations have been and remain for Ukrainians a source of strength, resilience and creativity. Most importantly, they can significantly affect the further course of the entire war.Now, with the government reform that abolished Minstrategprom, the Ministry of Defense faces a serious challenge — how to promptly and properly integrate the domestic defense industry into the ministry’s structure and ultimately equip the army with the combat capabilities for long‑range strikes. In fact, the defense ministry has been given a chance to create a modern architecture in which the main customer would coordinate not only the work of the defense‑industrial complex but also military‑technical cooperation. This could significantly accelerate the implementation of both domestic projects and joint ventures with partners. This is precisely how coordination of the defense industry is organized in many countries, for example France, Italy, the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Norway, South Korea and others.Undoubtedly, future special operations will be diverse. But mass employment of unmanned automated systems with the most powerful warheads will unquestionably play an important role in them. In other words, it is missiles as means of destruction that can become the main tool of operations of the future.This material was prepared in cooperation with the Consortium of Defense Information (CDI), a project that united Ukrainian analytical and research organizations and is aimed at strengthening informational support and analytical provision in the fields of national security, defense and geopolitics.