Ukraine’s experience has shown that any aggression from Russia must be met with a lightning-fast response. In February 2014, Ukraine failed to react quickly, and Crimea was occupied. The lack of response later led to the capture of Donetsk and Luhansk. Learning from this bitter experience, in 2022 we reacted instantly, giving rise to the “Kyiv in three days” meme.Therefore, we note: within the first 36 hours after the attack, neither Poland nor NATO delivered a decisive response. At least, we have yet to see any measures that could prevent Putin from striking again."This attack revealed how prepared Poland is for the modern air war that Russia can wage."We saw that to repel an attack of 19 drones, fighter jets from several countries were deployed, while German Patriot systems merely “monitored the situation.” In the end, advanced F-35 jets costing hundreds of millions used a few expensive air-defense missiles to shoot down three or four drones.Is this effective? A question for the experts. For comparison: on the night of September 11, Russia launched 66 drones over Ukraine, 62 of which were shot down or neutralized.The answer to the question of effectiveness can also be seen in Poland’s response: the next day, it asked allies for additional air defense systems and technologies to counter drones.In fact, Russia has realized that NATO’s eastern flank lacks a well-thought-out plan for air warfare. We still do not even know how many drones were over Poland and how many were shot down. This may indicate the absence of an early warning system for drone attacks, a shortage of short-range air defenses, and a lack of experienced operators."No one knows what conclusions Russian military analysts have drawn. But it is hard to imagine that they saw anything that would make future drone incursions into Poland too risky."How should Poland respond?It is obvious that this is a direct escalation by Russia. And, as we know, a Russian escalation can only be met with one’s own escalation. Ukraine has already provided examples: the naval blockade of our ports by the Black Sea Fleet in 2022 was an undeniable escalation against Ukraine, while the sinking of the Russian flagship cruiser Moskva was an escalation in response. The same applies to Operation Spider’s Web, attacks on refineries, or the elimination of Russian generals deep behind Russia’s lines.Of course, Poland may choose not to respond. But then Putin would count it as a technical defeat, and it’s not clear that this would be a better option. Warsaw would be forced to seek new security guarantees, as NATO’s assurances would appear less threatening to the Kremlin.As for security guarantees for Ukraine, they currently make no practical sense. No EU country is capable of guaranteeing even its own security. Moreover, the Ukrainian army has real combat experience. Strengthening the Armed Forces of Ukraine would be far cheaper and more effective than building up each national army separately."Therefore, if Europe truly intends to ensure its own security, it must do so together with Ukraine, and it must start doing so immediately."Symmetrical response and new security modelFor Europe’s future security, a symmetrical response is needed: Russia’s creeping escalation must be met in kind. For example, deploying a European air defense garrison near Lviv would also be an escalation in response. It’s not certain that Russia would react, as it has already made its move in this game. But this would give Polish forces essential practical experience, and Poland itself would demonstrate a strong response to the Kremlin’s challenge.At the same time, Europe must build up its own armed forces, independent of the U.S. Their foundation should be the Ukrainian army — the only one on the continent actively engaged in combat.This model would allow for effective solutions regarding armaments, logistics, joint combat standards, financing, and more. Moreover, motivated personnel could be recruited not only from Ukraine but also from other countries. This does not necessarily require compulsory mobilization. I am confident that European armies have enough motivated soldiers willing to join the defense of their countries in eastern Ukraine while maintaining their current service. Meanwhile, Ukrainian soldiers would receive European salaries, making service even more prestigious."Technological centers in Europe and NATO would also be more deeply integrated into the modern military context, adapting advanced developments more quickly to the realities of war."ConclusionOf course, this is only one possible scenario. Doing nothing is also an option. But if Poland and other EU countries truly aim to stop Russian aggression before it reaches their own borders, their choices are, in fact, limited.SourceAbout the author. Mykola Kniazhytskyi, journalist, Member of the Ukrainian Parliament.The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog or column authors.