Espreso journalist spoke with Moldovan political analysts Andrei Curăraru and Nicolae Negru to examine Moscow’s influence, disinformation, and the role of Ukraine in Moldova’s elections.Andrei Curăraru assessed how the Moldovan authorities are handling Moscow’s attempts to influence voters compared to previous elections.“Regarding the upcoming elections in Moldova - compared to the previous presidential elections, I would say we’re seeing two trends,” Curăraru explained. “On one hand, the police and the prosecutor’s office are starting to act much earlier. Previously, the fight against vote-buying mostly happened between the first and second rounds of the elections. In this parliamentary election, there is no second round, so everything is starting earlier. We now see almost daily arrests of people who organize this vote-buying system. What has also changed since the last elections is that law enforcement is now targeting the top organizers, rather than starting from the lower levels.”At the same time, according to him, the pro-Russian side has become more technologically sophisticated. They have moved into the Telegram ecosystem, using a program called TAITO, which allows people to sign contracts, log in with a selfie and passport, and shift payments to crypto wallets. “This lets them distribute payments faster, but it also exposes people to greater risks. If someone gains access to their crypto wallets, all transactions are transparent. This makes people more dependent on the system, because they are tied into this criminal network,” Curararu noted.When asked about the overall Russian or pro-Russian campaign to influence the Moldovan elections, the expert described it as weak and largely covert. “We are seeing a very weak campaign so far — in the sense that there is no real public campaign. The pro-Russian side is focusing on a more covert approach, involving vote-buying, various forms of disinformation, and new ways of engaging churches, teachers, and other local opinion leaders at the city and rural levels to convince people to take part in these systems. The state this time is responding more effectively, but the pro-Russian side has also become more sophisticated and better prepared for this campaign.”Disinformation narrativesSpeaking about disinformation, Curararu argued that the messages have shifted. “It seems to me that they have become simpler. In the previous campaign, there was a lot of emphasis on neutrality, but now, especially Ilan Shor (a pro-Russian oligarch — ed.) himself, has abandoned that message. He says that we should join the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Military alliances - this means the country’s neutrality is completely off the table. He says that we should adopt the ruble as the national currency, and join the Russia-Belarus Union State.”Other pro-Russian figures, Curăraru said, are more careful not to provoke local populations, but the discussion consistently revolves around a few themes: cheap gas and prospects for exports to Russia. Both, however, “don’t really exist.” Instead, what is being offered are “economic ‘benefits’ that are largely mythical, aimed at making people focus on very basic needs rather than geopolitics or national development.”Curăraru added that even pro-Russian politicians say that if they come to power, a crisis would follow, “because the EU would stop aid to Moldova, and they would have to seek funding elsewhere, including from Russia or China. But there is no concrete development plan. Their programs are more declarative than realistic.”In his view, these narratives mainly serve to lure people into vote-buying networks and create an illusion of nostalgia for good relations with Russia, supposedly recalling the “stable” 2000s. “In reality, the 2000s in our country were far from fully stable or prosperous,” he stressed.The question of UkraineCurăraru also addressed how Ukraine factors into the election. “There isn’t such an active discussion about refugees as there was in the first years, but what is becoming increasingly evident is the repeated message: don’t repeat Ukraine’s path.”He recalled a statement by former Moldovan president Igor Dodon, who during a livestream compared President Maia Sandu to Mikheil Saakashvili, saying she had two paths: either give up power and remain irrelevant like Saakashvili, or “take the Zelenskyy route - getting into conflict with the Russian Federation.”According to Curăraru, many of the narratives created for Russian domestic audiences also spill over into Moldova’s Russian-speaking space, since “they follow the same Telegram channels.”“I would say that Ukraine is used more indirectly as a scare tactic,” he explained. “For example, a very popular narrative has emerged here claiming that Maia Sandu promised 800 volunteers to go fight in Ukraine, or that if the pro-European party wins, Moldova will join NATO instead of the EU. These kinds of scare stories focus more on internal problems and fears than on Ukraine itself.”At the same time, Moldova, “surprisingly even for Europeans,” stands firmly with Ukraine. “Let’s be realistic,” Curăraru said, “what physical defense capability does Moldova have without Ukraine? Our only shield is Ukraine’s ability to hold out, and that gives us the possibility to simply support Ukraine. Any discussions that someone might join the EU faster than others are meaningless. If there were occupying forces on Moldovan territory, being a member of the EU would not help us.”Moldovan political analyst Nicolae Negru: “Ukraine is being used as a scarecrow in our elections”When asked about the current elections in Moldova and whether the authorities have managed to reduce Moscow’s influence, political analyst Nicolae Negru stressed that authorities are now desperately trying to protect elections from direct Russian interference.“A number of propaganda TV channels, radio stations, and websites have been shut down. They are also fighting fake news and working to block financial flows intended to corrupt politicians and build voter networks controlled by FSB coordinators. How effective these efforts are - we will only know after September 28,” Negru explained.According to him, Moscow uses both hidden and open methods of interference:“Beyond covert, subversive tactics, Moscow does not shy away from direct, cynical lies at the highest level, designed to intimidate our voters. The key messages are the same: that the Moldovan authorities are Russophobes, puppets of a Russophobic West pushing Moldova down Ukraine’s path - toward war with Russia. They claim Moldova violates the rights of Russian speakers, and that Russia will defend them. Moscow isn’t really tailoring its propaganda to Moldovan realities - it simply repeats the same threats it made before the invasion of Ukraine.”On the question of the war in Ukraine, Negru noted that pro-Russian parties accuse the government of violating constitutional neutrality because it supports Ukraine.“They accuse the government of violating constitutional neutrality because it supports Ukraine, condemned the aggressor, and joined EU sanctions against Russia. These parties promise voters a restoration of relations with Moscow and, of course, ‘cheap’ Russian gas - while avoiding the question of how this gas would even be delivered, and what kind of relationship Moldova would then have with neighboring Ukraine.”Negru argues that Ukraine is instrumentalized in Russia’s disinformation campaigns:“Uraine is being used as a scarecrow. Actions aimed at strengthening our army, with EU support in this process, are portrayed as preparations for war on Ukraine’s side, against Russia. Voters are frightened with claims that our youth will be used as cannon fodder in the “geopolitical interests of other countries.”And, of course, in an effort to scare Moldovan voters away from the European course at any cost, there is the recurring mention of so-called “traditional family and Orthodox values,” which are supposedly being trampled in Europe but faithfully and selflessly defended in Russia by the war criminal Putin”, Nicolae Negru said.