U.S., EU shift strategy on Ukraine war: what does it mean?
global.espreso.tv
Thu, 10 Jul 2025 14:17:00 +0300

1. Trump seems to have finally understood Putin’s personal role in blocking any real agreements. That may sound obvious to us, but it’s a major shift. Trump doesn’t think in terms of systems — just individuals. And now he sees Putin not as someone you can deal with, but as the main problem. Most EU leaders figured this out earlier.2. As a result, there’s a strong chance the West will start pushing the idea that Putin is not someone you can negotiate with and that he also can’t protect his allies. This same message will likely be echoed inside Russia, especially to the elites."This doesn’t mean a coup is coming. It means that the idea of “no Putin – no Russia” might start to shift (for the elites) into “no Putin – there’s a future.”"3. Right now, the US has few real tools to pressure Putin. I’ve said before that the Graham Act is very limited. It only really works if there’s a deal with India and China — the main buyers of Russian oil. In truth, this law isn’t just about Russia; it’s mostly about US-China talks.4. In this context, Ursula von der Leyen’s statement that “China’s support for Russia in its full-scale war against Ukraine is unacceptable to the EU” matters a lot. She added this will be a key issue in EU-China relations. The EU is China’s top trading partner, and China sells €305 billion more to Europe than it buys. Sure, the Chinese market is also huge — worth €213 billion. The EU doesn’t want a trade war, especially during a recession. But this is the start of long talks, and Ukraine will be one of the topics on the table.5. I’ve said many times that we’re part of the big US-EU talks. And now, it looks like the broader EU-China dialogue has begun, and the US-China talks have moved into a new stage. Ukraine has a real, though specific, place in all of it. I’ve also said again and again: these negotiations, especially between the US and EU, are the key to ending the war.6. It’s hard to predict the timing. Earlier, I thought these talks would start in October or November. But thanks to Putin’s stupidity, things are moving faster. Still, they won’t be quick. I don’t expect to see real results before the end of this year and more likely not before February–March 2026. I usually prefer to stay pessimistic in forecasts like this.7. Just recently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented its new structure — and there’s no separate department for China. Our diplomats still act like China isn’t a global power, just a big and important country. I think that’s a serious mistake.SourceAbout the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.The editorial staff does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.
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