ContentsChanging flow of U.S. weapons to UkraineAmerica’s share in European military support for UkraineWhat level of U.S. military aid can Ukraine realistically expect?The structure of U.S. military aid to Ukraine has changed. It is now embedded in a broader framework of transatlantic cooperation between the United States and Europe. In this new model, European governments, EU institutions, and NATO no longer play just a political role in supporting Ukraine’s defense—they are now financing and managing key logistics for the transfer of American-made weapons.The U.S. remains committed to military support for Ukraine. Although next year’s assistance will be smaller than the large-scale packages of 2022–2024, it will be far from zero. In fact, there is strong reason to believe support will grow, especially if Washington views military aid as a long-term investment in Ukraine’s economy—one that could yield returns for the U.S. down the road.This philosophy mirrors America’s post–World War II strategy, when it invested heavily in rebuilding Europe and Japan to foster joint economic growth under U.S. leadership.Changing flow of U.S. weapons to UkraineA key shift occurred in July 2025 during a meeting between Donald Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Scotland. The two sides agreed on the framework for a new transatlantic partnership: the U.S. would remain involved in European security—but under more favorable economic conditions for Washington.As part of the deal, the U.S. agreed not to impose 30% tariffs on European goods and instead settled for a 15% cap. In return, the EU made three major commitments:Purchase up to $100 billion in U.S. armsImport $750 billion in U.S. energy over three yearsFacilitate $600 billion in private investment into U.S. industryThe $100 billion defense commitment is not legally binding, but it aligns with NATO procurement projections and the defense ministries’ plans in leading EU countries—including support for Ukraine.Roughly $60–70 billion of that amount will likely fund European rearmament using next-generation American weapons like the F-35, Patriot systems, autonomous platforms, and AI-enabled command systems. These purchases are financed through national defense budgets and count toward NATO’s new 5% GDP defense spending target. This equipment is not destined for Ukraine.However, up to $20–30 billion of the $100 billion may be directly or indirectly connected to Ukraine. A “replacement model” is emerging in which Ukraine receives still-modern American weapons from European stockpiles, while European governments purchase cutting-edge U.S. arms to replenish what’s been transferred to Kyiv.A third channel, already reflected in U.S. legislation, involves European countries placing direct orders in the U.S. for weapons specifically intended for Ukraine—including tactical drones, loitering munitions, and air defense interceptors. These systems are made for Ukraine’s Defense Forces, bypassing the replacement track.America’s share in European military support for UkraineNew U.S.-EU agreements form the backbone of continued arms flows to Ukraine but do not eliminate direct U.S. military aid channels. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), and the use of frozen Russian assets under the REPO Act remain in place—though scaled down in favor of European funding.In the 2026 U.S. budget, military assistance to Ukraine is estimated at $2.6 billion, broken down as follows:$1.6 billion through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, which subsidizes arms sales to foreign governments—including support for purchases made on Ukraine’s behalf by its allies.$800 million through USAI, which funds equipment, ammunition, training, and logistics. Though lower than peak 2022–2023 levels, USAI remains operational.$225 million through the Baltic Security Initiative, which, while not officially linked to Ukraine, strengthens the logistical infrastructure in Poland and the Baltic states—indirectly supporting Ukrainian supply routes.The $2.6 billion earmarked for Ukraine is significantly lower than during the peak years of assistance, but the aid remains substantial, with clear potential for expansion.Over the five-year lifespan of the U.S.-EU package negotiated in Scotland, American military assistance could reach at least $13 billion—a conservative estimate.A new bipartisan bill in the U.S. Senate, the PEACE Act, could formalize a funding mechanism. It would establish a special U.S. Treasury fund filled by NATO member-state contributions, used to replenish American arms sent to Ukraine. Annual contributions are expected to total $5–8 billion, potentially reaching $40 billion over five years—making this mechanism compatible with the broader European model.The Supporting Ukraine Act of 2025, also in the Senate, proposes a significant increase in U.S. assistance—reframing it as investment in Ukraine’s economic future. While still more a policy signal than a fully actionable plan, the bill underscores continued American interest in keeping Ukraine tied to U.S. strategic goals.It proposes $30 billion in military assistance over two fiscal years:Half through USAIHalf for procurement, logistics, and replenishment of equipment sent to Ukraine or donated by alliesIt also includes:Annual FMF funding boosted to $3 billionPDA limits raised to $6 billionLegal pathways for confiscating or taxing Russian state assets to fund UkraineAuthorization to send captured Iranian weapons to Ukraine, pending legal reviewCreation of a joint weapons R&D program between the U.S., Ukraine, and Taiwan, with a $1 billion budget to co-develop drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems based on Ukraine’s battlefield experience, particularly relevant for Indo-Pacific defense planningCrucially, the bill proposes rethinking U.S. military aid as capital investment, in coordination with a U.S.-Ukraine resource agreement signed in April. Under this deal, U.S. arms deliveries could be treated as contributions to Ukraine’s Reconstruction Fund, which supports energy projects, infrastructure, and critical mineral extraction—keeping it military aid in form, but economic development in function.What level of U.S. military aid can Ukraine realistically expect?American arms support to Ukraine continues—and will increasingly take place through the transatlantic framework established by Trump and von der Leyen. But the direct U.S. channel, dominant in earlier years, remains active.A conservative estimate places the total volume of U.S. weapons Ukraine could receive over the next five years at $50 billion—roughly $10 billion annually.Unlike 2022–2023, when deliveries were largely dictated by frontline urgency, the process is now shaped by longer-term planning and embedded in a new transatlantic architecture.This new phase will likely focus more heavily on technology transfers—including joint development of air- and sea-based autonomous systems using Ukraine’s battlefield data but powered by U.S. tech previously unavailable to Ukraine.For Kyiv, being woven into this new transatlantic system presents both opportunities and risks.On the one hand, deliveries could become more predictable and sustained. On the other, Ukraine loses the flexibility it once had. The deeper the integration into joint mechanisms, the narrower the room for independent decision-making on weapons use and doctrine.Ukraine’s ability to influence the pace and content of U.S. arms deliveries is likely to decline. That’s because the process now involves multiple European governments operating within a delicate balance of competing interests.In this new architecture, Ukraine’s status remains ambiguous. Without full EU or NATO membership, its involvement in arms supply chains, joint R&D, and defense production opens new doors—but also risks turning Ukraine into a testing ground for transatlantic military technology.At the same time, the philosophy of U.S. military aid is evolving—moving beyond traditional concepts of bilateral defense cooperation. Aid is now increasingly framed as a long-term investment in economic resilience and post-war recovery.To step fully into this new global order, Ukraine will need not only battlefield strength, but also political and institutional maturity. Only then can it become an equal and lasting part of the new transatlantic system.This article was developed in partnership with the Center for Defense Information (CDI), a collaborative project uniting Ukrainian think tanks and research institutions to provide in-depth analytical support for national security, defense, and geopolitical strategy.