Oleksii Izhak, analyst at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and co-founder of the Consortium for Defense Information, stated this on Espreso TV.“Russia is drawing conclusions from this war very quickly and is using its drone potential, gradually shaping it into military structures — analogues of batteries, squadrons, fleets, and armies. Because of this, Russian drone raids and the maintenance of the 'dead zone' at the front cannot simply be compared with traditional battles,” the expert explains.At the same time, he points out that Ukraine must take into account the pace and dynamics of production, Russia’s dependence on imports, and the vulnerabilities of Russian drone operations themselves.An important limitation for the production of all types of Russian drones, according to the expert, apart from available money, human resources, and industrial capacity, remains the import of certain key components: the Geran and Gerbera require imported engines or engine parts. 'Grey' imports and simplified technological solutions, which are difficult to restrict with sanctions, allow Russia to maintain high production rates, but at the same time make it dependent on bottlenecks in import logistics.“Given the goals of the war, Russia will make efforts to increase production of both 'strategic' long-range drones and tactical front-line devices. In practice, it does not have the resources for a 'tsunami' — such a massive surge that could destroy Ukraine’s air defense system and destabilize the frontline — but the likelihood of a noticeable increase, by several tens of percent in the near future, does exist,” Izhak notes.In this regard, the expert emphasizes the need for deterrence in three directions, even before waves and swarms of Russian drones make combat contact with defense forces.He highlights the following Russian vulnerabilities.First, production chains — both centralized (for long-range drones) and decentralized (for tactical ones) — are vulnerable.Second, restrictions on critical imports: closing markets with sanctions and administrative procedures does not create a significant effect for the economies of supplier countries, but can significantly affect drone production for the frontline in Russia.And third, the destruction of drone command structures at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels will be effective. “All command and headquarters structures for drone operations in Russia have not yet been fully formed. However, they already exist de facto, and their vulnerable elements are evident: planning and control centers, communication systems, supply logistics, and launch sites. Therefore, we must make every effort to reduce Russia’s drone potential before combat use,” the expert concludes.