What’s our plan if the war drags on for two, three, or even five more years?
global.espreso.tv
Wed, 15 Oct 2025 22:20:00 +0300

In 2022, the Kremlin might have believed Ukraine wouldn’t withstand the invasion. Our country had far fewer resources — we were supposed to lose the competition of economies. Yet instead, we’ve survived three and a half years of war in relatively sheltered conditions.Our economy has been towed along by our allies. The West not only supplies us with weapons and ammunition — thanks to European billions, Ukraine can cover social spending, pay pensions, and maintain public-sector salaries. In essence, we’ve been connected to an external life-support system — meaning the only thing we pay for ourselves is military spending.No rationing system has been introduced in Ukraine. Bank deposits haven’t been frozen. Utility rates have barely increased. We don’t pay “war taxes” and haven’t curbed luxury consumption. Store shelves look just as they did before the war — as do full restaurants. As a result, the Ukrainian rear barely feels the wartime economy.For that reason, the economy has become not our weak spot, but the enemy’s. We track how Russia’s budget deficit grows, how its reserves shrink, and bet on inflation levels and the pace of the money-printing press next year. Many believe that the moment Moscow senses a threat to its system and regime — it will pull the war’s emergency brake.At the same time, from day one of the war, Moscow has not suffered a shortage of soldiers. Russia experimented with mobilization for just four weeks — then switched to buying cannon fodder. Now the Kremlin watches Ukraine, hoping we’ll run out of troops before it runs out of money."Mobilization has indeed become our weakest point. Western assistance has created an illusion among Ukrainian authorities that unpopular decisions — like tightening mobilization rules — can wait. In the fourth year of war, we live by inertia, assuming the fighting will soon pause, and that we can “push through the last kilometer on willpower."In the first seven months of this year, more than 110,000 soldiers have gone AWOL — more than in the previous three years combined. The number may reach 200,000 by year’s end. More than half are new recruits who fear the army more than it deserves. The rest are those burned out after years of service — volunteers who enlisted to buy the country time to prepare reserves, but never received replacements. The problem is that mobilization has become so toxic that the authorities prefer to ignore it.This year, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told us there would be no demobilization — that everyone would serve until victory. The only question now is: how will the country adapt to this course?Where will Ukraine find new soldiers if the war drags on? How much will it pay a serviceman assigned to rear duties? How will it persuade a civilian not to throw a draft notice in the trash, when the fine is just 17,000 hryvnias?What will it tell veterans who see the stark contrast between life at the front and in the rear? How will it convince them that leaving the army isn’t the answer, if they feel they’ve already repaid their debt? What benefits will make veteran status more than a formality?What is our plan if the war lasts another two years? Three? Five? How does the government plan to retain those fighting since day one — and recruit those who haven’t yet joined?If the hot phase pauses within a year, inertia might carry us that far. But what if all our assessments of Russia’s economy are mere wishful thinking? What if, faced with a fiscal crunch, the Kremlin simply opts for scenarios we now deem impossible? After all, if Moscow acted rationally, the full-scale invasion would never have happened.We are waging a war waiting for Russia’s economy to collapse. Moscow is waging a war waiting for us to run out of soldiers. The difference is that the Kremlin finds it easier to make unpopular decisions — because its rulers can afford to ignore elections. Ours cannot afford to ignore elections at all.Our enemy has a plan for tomorrow. The question is whether we have one.SourceAbout the author: Pavlo Kazarin, journalist, TV host, laureate of the Taras Shevchenko National Prize of UkraineThe editorial board does not necessarily share the views expressed by the authors of opinion columns.
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